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NOTES 
IF IT’S BROKEN, SOMETIMES IT CAN’T BE 
FIXED:  
WHY THE AUCTION RATE SECURITIES 
MARKET WAS FAULTY FROM ITS 
INCEPTION AND HOW BROKER-DEALERS 
CAUSED ITS DOWNFALL 
Brendan P. Tracy 
INTRODUCTION 
In late 2007, brothers Brian and Basil Maher lost access to 
approximately a quarter of the massive fortune the two had entrusted with 
various financial firms, including the now defunct Lehman Brothers.1 The 
Maher brothers had recently sold their almost fifty-year-old shipping 
business to one of Deutsche Bank’s investment units for more than $1 
billion.2 Hoping to “[p]reserve capital”3 and maintain “sufficient liquidity”4 
with the profits made from the sale, the Mahers spread their cash among 
three separate financial firms to deal with their short-term investments.5 
However, when Lehman Brothers invested about $400 million of the 
Mahers’ account in investments known as “auction rate securities,” the 
Mahers became alarmed because they did not think that these investments 
fit into their prescribed investment objectives. 6 It turns out the Mahers’ 
concerns were justified. 
                                                                                                                                          
 1. Robert Frank, Debt Crisis Hits a Dynasty, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2008, at A1. 
 2. Id. Michael Maher, the father of Brian and Basil, created a shipping terminal in Port 
Elizabeth, N.J. in the 1950s, and the company quickly expanded into a massive shipping empire. 
Id. In the 1960s, Michael “invested heavily in building a facility that could load and unload 
‘containers’—the giant metal boxes that are now the main building block of the global shipping 
trade.” Id. In the early 1990s, Brian was named chief executive of the company, and Basil took the 
position of president. Id. In July of 2007, the brothers completed the sale of their company, Maher 
Terminals, to Deutsche Bank’s RREEF Infrastructure. American Shipper, Maher Brothers Make 
$1.1 Billion Claim Against Lehman, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.americanshipper.com/SNW_ 
story.asp?news=82206. 
 3. Frank, supra note 1. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. The Maher brothers and their financial advisor had a list of three financial objectives: 
(1) “[p]reserve capital”; (2) “provide sufficient liquidity”; and (3) “capture a market rate of return 
based on [the brothers’] investment policy parameters and market conditions.” Id. (quoting a 
“letter the family sent the banks”). These financial objectives were laid out to Lehman Brothers, 
UBS AG, and JP Morgan Chase & Co., the three investment firms the Mahers entrusted their 
money with. Id. 
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Over the next several months, the Mahers’ funds, tied up in these 
auction rate securities, become extremely inaccessible, losing any sense of 
liquidity they might have once possessed.7 Auction rate securities are 
known in the financial world as long-term corporate or municipal bonds 
“with interest rates . . . that are periodically re-set . . . typically every 7, 14, 
28, or 35 days.”8 First developed in 1984,9 these investments were marketed 
to potential investors as short-term, safe, highly-liquid alternatives to 
money market funds.10 Auction rate securities differ from normal types of 
bonds, with the “interest rate [for each security being] set through an 
auction (commonly referred to as a ‘Dutch’ auction) in which bids with 
successively higher rates are accepted until all of the securities in the 
auction are sold.”11 However, when there is not enough demand for the 
securities, an auction failure results.12 An auction failure means that few, if 
any, of the securities change hands, resulting in an inability on the part of 
the investors to sell the investments.13 Over the last few decades, broker-
dealers and investment banks have intervened in order to prevent auction 
failures, by acting as “buyers of . . . last resort,” keeping the rate of failed 
auctions at a very low level.14 
However, in late 2007, the market for auction rate securities froze up, 
preventing investors from liquidating their investments in the market.15 
When demand for these securities declined substantially, broker-dealers and 
investment bankers ceased acting as “buyers of . . . last resort,” refusing to 
bid on the excess of auction rate securities available.16 The departure of 
broker-dealers and investment banks from the market has resulted in 
devastating illiquidity for thousands of investors in the United States. It has 
also caused a massive flood of litigation and investigation aimed at 
financial institutions, with investors claiming that they were not fully 
                                                                                                                                          
 7. See id.  
 8. Bear Stearns & Co., Securities Act Release No. 8684, Exchange Act Release No. 53,888, 
88 SEC Docket 259, 260 (May 31, 2006). 
 9. Id.  
 10. Frank, supra note 1. 
 11. Bear Stearns & Co., 88 SEC Docket at 260. 
 12. See Glenn S. Gitomer, Auction Rate Securities: A Crisis Foretold, in SECURITIES 
ARBITRATION 2008: EVOLVING & IMPROVING, at 361, 363–64 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Series No. 14,310, 2008). 
 13. See Megan Johnston, Auction-Rate Securities Suffer Total Insecurity, FIN. WK., Feb. 18, 
2008, http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080218/REG/698824530. 
 14. John Carney, Did Auction Rate Securities Ever Have a Natural Success Rate?, 
DEALBREAKER, Feb. 27, 2008, http://dealbreaker.com/2008/02/did_auction_rate_securities 
_ev.php. While there had been very few failures of auctions throughout the past few decades in 
the auction rate securities market, eighty-seven percent of all of the auctions in the market 
experienced failures on Thursday, February 14, 2008. Johnston, supra note 13. 
 15. See Darrell Preston, Auction Debt Succumbs to Bid-Rig Taint as Citi Flees (Update4), 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid= 
aXXucptLVGuc&refer=news. 
 16. Carney, supra note 14. 
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apprised of all of the risks of these so-called highly-liquid and safe 
investments.17 
To understand how the market, once advertised as a safe alternative for 
investors with a low-risk appetite, collapsed and froze-up, it is necessary to 
analyze the history and development of auction rate securities. Part I of this 
note summarizes the creation and expansion of the auction rate securities 
market.18 Part II examines how the market collapsed, including the effect 
that the subprime mortgage meltdown and the ensuing credit crisis had on 
the breakdown of these investments.19 Part III explores the practice of 
broker-dealers in “stabilizing” certain markets in order to facilitate liquidity 
and how this practice differed from the “manipulation” practices that the 
financial institutions used in the auction rate securities market.20 Part IV 
argues that the market was doomed to fail because of the irrational and 
irresponsible actions of the broker-dealers in propping-up the market in 
order to fuel their desire for larger investment fees.21 This note will further 
argue that the broker-dealers never should have played such a large role and 
that in order for the market to have followed on its natural path there needed 
to be much less intervention by the broker-dealers. Part V offers solutions 
as to how to restore confidence in the markets by prohibiting the creation of 
products such as auction rate securities in the future.22 Part VI concludes 
this note by summarizing the importance of these issues.23 
I. THE AUCTION RATE SECURITIES MARKETS 
A. THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET 
Auction rate securities were first introduced in 1984,24 and further 
developed in 1988, when Goldman Sachs introduced the first “‘periodic 
auction asset securities’[] through a $121,400,000 offering for the Industrial 
Development Authority of Pima County, Arizona.”25 While auction rate 
securities may seem to be extremely complex investment alternatives, they 
“are far simpler than the mysterious name suggests.”26 
                                                                                                                                          
 17. See Posting of Amir Efrati to WSJ Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/05/13/ 
auction-rate-securities-legal-headache-for-wall-street-and-how/ (May 13, 2008, 12:27 DST). 
 18. See infra pp. 299–305. 
 19. See infra pp. 305–10. 
 20. See infra pp. 310–14. 
 21. See infra pp. 314–17. 
 22. See infra pp. 318–20. 
 23. See infra pp. 320–21. 
 24. Bear Stearns & Co., Securities Act Release No. 8684, Exchange Act Release No. 53,888, 
88 SEC Docket 259, at 260 (May 31, 2006). 
 25. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 364. 
 26. Id. at 361. 
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Auction rate securities are long-term debt instruments,27 with “interest 
rates that reset monthly or weekly according to a scheduled auction 
process.”28 These bonds are normally issued by state and local government 
agencies, corporations,29 and college student-loan programs.30 “The 
principal difference between typical debt instruments and [auction rate 
securities] is how interest rates are set.”31 Instead of having an interest rate 
that is fixed at the time of issuance, auction rate securities have interest 
rates that fluctuate on a weekly or monthly basis, depending on the interest 
rate that investors are willing to accept at the time of auction.32 
This trait makes auction rate securities attractive not only to investors, 
but also to the corporations, government agencies, and municipalities who 
issue these securities because of the lower interest rate that is normally paid 
on them as compared to long-term bonds.33 In recent years, the popularity 
of auction rate securities “has ballooned . . . amid low interest rates as 
investors look for short-term investments that offer better [interest rates] 
than Treasury bills, certificates of deposit, or money-market funds.”34 
Therefore, the issuers of these securities have “the ability to raise long-term 
money at short-term rates and retain the right to change the [frequency at 
which interest rates are set].”35 
B. HOW THE AUCTIONS WORK 
The issuer of auction rate securities hires broker-dealers “such as 
Goldman Sachs, . . . Citicorp, Lehman Bro[thers], etc., as well as many 
regional brokers” to issue the bonds and run the auctions.36 The broker-
                                                                                                                                          
 27. Bear Stearns & Co., 88 SEC Docket at 260. (“Auction rate bonds are usually issued with 
maturities of 30 years, but the maturities can range from 5 years to perpetuity.”). 
 28. Know the Risks and Rewards, AUCTION RATE SEC. (SVB Fin. Group & SVB Asset Mgmt., 
S.F., Cal.), Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.svbassetmanagement.com/pdfs/AuctionRateSecurities 
0907.pdf [hereinafter Risks & Rewards]. 
 29. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 361–62. 
 30. Frank, supra note 1. 
 31. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 362. 
 32. Id. Normal debt instruments have an interest rate that is set forth at issuance. Id. Because 
the investor in long-term fixed interest debt “bears the risk of changes in the market price of the 
debt instrument due to fluctuations in the interest rate environment and changes in the credit risk 
of the issuer,” the interest rates paid on short-term debt are normally much lower than those paid 
on long-term debt. Id. 
 33. Risks & Rewards, supra note 28 (explaining “[f]ew AAA-rated securities offer such 
valuation simplicity and enhanced yield over Treasuries that ARS provide, making them a popular 
cash management tool”). 
 34. Allison Bisbey Colter, Auction-Rate Securities Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2005, at 
D6. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Adam Warren & Dwight Grant, Commentary, Auction-Rate Securities: Legal and 
Valuation Insights, ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP., June 3, 2008, at 1, available at 
http://www.duffandphelps.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/AuctionRateSecuritiesLegalandValuatio
nInsights.pdf#page=1. Broker-dealers usually earned fees from the issuers for helping to issue the 
bonds and also normally earned a “regular 25-basis-point annual fee for running the auction.” Id. 
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dealers, while receiving fees from the issuers, are also responsible to the 
investors purchasing the securities.37 The broker-dealers have an obligation 
to the issuer “to solicit bids on the regularly scheduled auction dates, and 
[an] obligation to the investors of the securities . . . to manage the auction 
process [according to the securities’ guidelines].”38 
On the specified dates, the securities are auctioned at par value39 with 
the broker-dealers submitting bids for investors, or on their own behalf, for 
“$25,000 . . . [blocks of the securities] they are willing to buy at a given 
interest rate.”40 Therefore, in the auction rate market, it is “the interest rate 
that fluctuates, not the value of the debt instrument.”41 In an auction, 
investors can submit the following types of orders to their broker-dealer: 
1) [A] “hold” order, which is the default order for current investors (i.e., 
the order that is entered for a current holder if the holder takes no action), 
where a current investor will keep the securities at the rate at which the 
auction clears; 2) a “hold-at-rate” bid, where a current investor will only 
keep the securities if the clearing rate is at or above the specified rate; 3) a 
“sell” order, where a current investor will sell the securities regardless of 
the clearing rate; or 4) a “buy” bid, where a prospective investor, or a 
current investor who wants more securities, will buy securities if the 
clearing rate is at or above the[ir] specified rate.42 
The broker-dealers then submit these bids to an auction agent, who is 
hired by the issuer of the securities.43 The auction agent then calculates the 
“Clearing Rate,” “which is the highest rate bid at the point that there are 
sufficient bids to purchase all shares offered for sale.”44 The auction agent is 
then responsible for allocating the securities to the proper investors.45 
In essence, the investors “submit the lowest [interest rate that] they are 
willing to accept, and the auction manager fills the bids with the available 
                                                                                                                                          
“Investors can only submit orders [for the auction] through the selected broker-dealers,” making 
this a very lucrative market for those broker-dealers who are lucky enough to be the lead 
underwriter of these offerings. Bear Stearns & Co., Securities Act Release No. 8684, Exchange 
Act Release No. 53,888, 88 SEC Docket 259, at 260 (May 31, 2006). 
 37. Risks & Rewards, supra note 28. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Bear Stearns & Co., 88 SEC Docket 259, at 260. The “securities are auctioned at par so the 
return on investment to the investor and the cost of financing to the issuer between auction dates is 
determined by the interest rate or dividend yield set through the auctions.” Id. 
 40. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 362. “Typically, the minimum investment [in auction rate 
securities] is $25,000.” Bear Stearns & Co., 88 SEC Docket at 260. 
 41. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 362. 
 42. Bear Stearns & Co., 88 SEC Docket at 260. In most auctions, the disclosure documents 
related to the auctions “often state that an investor’s order is an irrevocable offer.” Id. 
 43. Risks & Rewards, supra note 28. 
 44. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 362. “The final rate at which all of the securities are sold at is 
[known as] the ‘clearing rate’ that applies to all of the securities in the auction until the next 
auction.” Bear Stearns & Co., 88 SEC Docket at 260. 
 45. Risks & Rewards, supra note 28. 
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securities starting at the bottom until all the securities are allocated.”46 
Through this auction process, the auction agent is able to determine the 
lowest interest rate necessary (the Clearing Rate) to sell all of the securities 
available in that auction.47 “[Every investor] who bids [an interest rate that 
is] lower than the clearing rate receives the value of securities desired and 
earns the clearing rate.”48 Bids, starting “with the lowest rate and then 
[moving] successively [to the] higher rates[,] are accepted until all of the 
sell orders are filled.”49 
When allocating the securities among the investors, the auction agent 
distributes the securities based on the orders the broker-dealers submitted 
on behalf of themselves and other investors.50 “When there are more bids 
for securities at the clearing rate than securities remaining for sale, the 
securities are allocated on a pro-rata basis first to the hold-at-rate bidders 
and then to the buy bidders.”51 “If there are no sellers of [the securities at a 
particular auction] the result is an ‘all hold’ outcome where interest rates are 
set at a default rate that is generally lower than the current rate.”52 
However, the opposite situation could arise where there is a lower 
demand for the securities being auctioned, resulting in an overabundance in 
the supply of these securities at a given auction.53 “If there are not enough 
investors willing to purchase . . . all shares of a particular issue offered for 
sale, the auction fails and no securities change hands.”54 Essentially, 
“[a]uctions fail if there aren’t enough interested bidders,” or buyers, on a 
specific auction date.55 There can be major ramifications for both the 
investors and issuers of these securities when an auction fails, including a 
                                                                                                                                          
 46. Warren & Grant, supra note 36, at 1. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Bear Stearns & Co., 88 SEC Docket 259, at 260. 
 50. Id. at 261.  
 51. Id.  
  For example, suppose $100,000 of securities were for sale and the auction received 
four buy bids. Bid A was for $50,000 at 1.10%, Bid B was for $50,000 at 1.15%, Bid C 
was for $50,000 at 1.15%, and Bid D was for $25,000 at 1.20%. Under these 
circumstances, the “clearing rate” would be 1.15%, meaning all of the securities in the 
auction would pay interest at a rate of 1.15% until the next auction. Bid A would be 
allocated $50,000, Bids B and C would receive pro-rata allocations ($25,000 each), and 
Bid D would receive no allocation [due to the fact that the interest rate bid in Bid D was 
higher than the ultimate “clearing rate”]. 
Id. at 260 n.4. 
 52. Warren & Grant, supra note 36, at 2. 
 53. See Daniel Rockey, Auction-Rate Securities: The Next Frontier in Subprime Litigation or 
a Dead End for the Plaintiffs’ Bar?, 22 NO. 23 ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP. 13 (June 2, 
2008). 
 54. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 362–63 (emphasis in original). 
 55. Johnston, supra note 13. 
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loss of liquidity for those particular securities.56 “In the event of a [f]ailed 
[a]uction, a [f]ail [r]ate,”57 is then paid to the holders of the securities by the 
issuer of the securities.58 
The fail rate, defined in the securities’ prospectus, can range “anywhere 
from a few percentage points to as high as 20[%],”59 and “is often some 
percentage above comparable commercial paper or LIBOR (London 
Interbank Offered Rate) rates.”60 If investors in auction rate securities have 
no pressing liquidity needs, a failed auction may result in a fairly profitable 
occurrence because they would now be reaping the benefits of higher 
interest payments.61 However, if investors require liquidity in their 
investments, they are faced with the unenviable position of holding the 
securities until liquidity opens up,62 or possibly selling the auction rate 
securities in “a thin secondary market for less than par value.”63 There are 
also damaging consequences for issuers of auction rate securities if an 
auction for their securities fails, with the issuer “hav[ing] to pay 
substantially higher interest rates on their debt.”64 
C. BROKER-DEALERS’ ROLE IN THE AUCTIONS 
Broker-dealers such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill 
Lynch play a significant role in the sale of auction rate securities by 
underwriting the offerings and managing the auction process.65 The issuer 
of the securities also “pays an annualized fee to [the broker-dealers who] 
manage an auction (typically [twenty-five] basis points for the par value of 
the securities that it manages).”66 In order for the process to run efficiently, 
the broker-dealers specify a time by which investors must submit their bids 
to it.67 The broker-dealers then process and submit the orders to the 
                                                                                                                                          
 56. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 363. “Between auctions, investors might . . . [have the 
opportunity] to buy or sell [the] auction rate securities in . . . [some type of] secondary market at 
prices greater than, equal to, or less than par.” Bear Stearns & Co., 88 SEC Docket at 260 n.3. 
 57. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 363. The fail rate “is the [m]aximum [a]uction [r]ate specified 
in the prospectus or debt instrument.” Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Warren & Grant, supra note 36, at 2. 
 60. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 363. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Outside of a very thin secondary market, an investor would most likely have to hold their 
securities until the sooner of “the next successful auction at which there are sufficient purchasers 
willing to buy all of the [auction rate securities] offered . . . . or the maturity or earlier call of the 
[auction rate securities].” Id.  
 63. Id. While there is not a large secondary market for these auction rate securities, some 
“firms with electronic trading networks are now attempting to offer secondary markets for 
auction-rate securities that cannot be sold at auction.” Alan Rappeport, Buyers Be Where?, 
CFO.COM, Apr. 1, 2008, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10950592?f=search. 
 64. Warren & Grant, supra note 36, at 2. 
 65. Bear Stearns & Co., Securities Act Release No. 8684, Exchange Act Release No. 53,888, 
88 SEC Docket 259, at 260 (May 31, 2006). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
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assigned auction agent before a certain deadline.68 As the auction rate 
securities market has progressed, the role of broker-dealers has become 
increasingly more involved with the facilitation of successful auctions.69 
Since its inception, the value of the auction rate securities market has 
blossomed, reaching over $200 billion in 2006, and over70 $330 billion in 
February 2008.71 Much of this success was due to the fact that the broker-
dealers themselves are able to place bids in the auctions for these securities, 
along with the other investors whom the broker-dealers are helping to 
purchase or sell these securities.72 Broker-dealers submit their bids for 
several reasons, including “to avoid having a [f]ailed [a]uction or to avoid 
having an [a]uction clear at a [r]ate the [b]roker-[d]ealer in good faith 
believes is above its [e]stimated [m]arket [r]ate.”73 Broker-dealers, while 
not obligated to submit bids in a particular auction, may place bids that 
ultimately have an effect on the outcome of the auction “as long as it is an 
[e]stimated [m]arket [b]id.”74 
Since the market’s creation, broker-dealers have consistently submitted 
bids on their own behalf in auctions claiming that “their intervention is for 
the good of the market as a whole.”75 Due to “imbalances in bidding interest 
in a particular [a]uction,”76 the auction may be subject to failing or it may 
be “subject to clearing at a [r]ate that the [b]roker-[d]ealer in good faith 
believes is above an [e]stimated [m]arket [r]ate.”77 Therefore, broker-
                                                                                                                                          
 68. Id.  
 69. See generally Gitomer, supra note 12. 
 70. Martha Mahan Haines, Chief, Office of Mun. Secs., SEC, Comments to the Tenth Annual 
Conference of Women in Public Finance (Sept. 29, 2006). 
 71. Michael Quint, Muni Regulators Seek Disclosure on Auction-Rate Bonds (Update1), 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ayej 
Ze3dpOeQ&refer=home. 
 72. See BEST PRACTICES FOR BROKER-DEALERS OF AUCTION RATE SECURITIES § 4.3.2 (Sec. 
Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Ass’n 2007), available at http://www.sifma.org/services/pdf/AuctionRate 
Securities_FinalBestPractices.pdf [hereinafter SIFMA]. 
 73. Id. “Estimated Market Rate” is defined as 
[a] Rate or range of Rates which, in the Broker-Dealer’s good faith judgment, reflects a 
fair and reasonable Rate, taking into consideration such circumstances as it believes are 
relevant, including prevailing market conditions with respect to such security at the 
time of the determination, general economic conditions and trends, current Rates for 
comparable securities, and the issuer’s financial condition and prospects. In 
determining the Estimated Market Rate, a Broker-Dealer should not take into 
consideration the interest of the issuer in paying a low Rate or the interest of investors 
in receiving a high Rate. In addition, in determining the Estimated Market Rate for 
purposes of submitting a Bid for its own account, the Broker-Dealer may also consider 
such factors as the expense involved, the size of the Broker-Dealer’s inventory position, 
its capital requirements and its risk management needs. 
Id. § 3. 
 74. Id. § 4.3.2.  
 75. Mahan Haines, supra note 70. 
 76. SIFMA, supra note 72, § 4.3.2. 
 77. Id.  
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dealers have intervened to play a larger role in the market, providing 
increased liquidity to the auction rate securities market in order to prevent 
failed auctions.78 
By injecting their own bids into the market to prevent failed auctions, 
the broker-dealers were market saviors; that is,“[i]f you had more sell 
orders than buy orders, they’d pick up the difference and you wouldn’t have 
a failed auction.”79 In short, the broker-dealers were acting as “buyers of . . . 
last resort.”80 According to some, the reason the broker-dealers consistently 
submitted bids in order to prevent auction failures was obvious since the 
“broker-dealers had every financial incentive to sell them to their 
customers.”81 
II. THE COLLAPSE OF THE AUCTION RATE SECURITIES 
MARKET 
For over two decades, the auction rate securities market seemed to work 
seamlessly, with the “market facilitat[ing] incredible amounts of volume” 
among investors.82 Until late 2007, “there were less than [fifty] failed 
auctions,”83 which resulted in confidence among investors and a high 
demand for the auction rate securities. However, under this shroud of 
success was a somewhat finicky market that did not always operate the way 
that its creators intended. In early February 2008, the auction rate securities 
market, touted as a safe, highly liquid, and short term investment option for 
investors, “vanished into thin air . . . [and] became illiquid.”84 “In the week 
of Feb[ruary] 11, 2008 alone, almost 1,000 [auction rate securities auctions] 
failed,” resulting in the loss of liquidity for thousands of investors who held 
a significant number of these securities.85 By tracing the history of the 
auction rate securities market, it is easy to see why the market ultimately 
collapsed in early 2008. As this note suggests, the main reason for the 
collapse was the role that broker-dealers and investment banks were playing 
in the market—acting as bidders of last resort. 
As explained in Part I, broker-dealers and the investment banks that ran 
the auctions would submit bids on their own behalf in order to prevent an 
auction failure and to facilitate the exchange of these securities among 
                                                                                                                                          
 78. Preston, supra note 15. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Carney, supra note 14. 
 81. Melanie Cherdack & Daniel A. Ball, Auction Rate Securities: The New Frontier, in 
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2008: EVOLVING & IMPROVING, at 335, 343 (PLI Corp. Law & 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 14,310, 2008). 
 82. John Fazio et al., The Genesis of a Troubled Product: Auction Rate Securities, in 
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2008: EVOLVING & IMPROVING, at 325, 330 (PLI Corp. Law & 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 14, 1310, 2008). 
 83. Id.  
 84. Cherdack & Ball, supra note 81, at 337. 
 85. Warren & Grant, supra note 36, at 2. 
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investors.86 While this may have continued to keep the market afloat when 
there were not enough investors in a particular auction willing to purchase 
the securities, this practice was also the main cause of the demise of the 
market.87 Broker-dealers, by submitting their own bids, created a “managed 
bidding system” within the auctions.88 “Broker-dealers participated in the 
auctions by infusing their own capital in order to prevent them from failing” 
when there was not enough demand for a particular security.89 Because of 
the increased participation of the broker-dealers in the auctions, the auction 
rate securities market had an “illusory liquidity.”90 
As the size of the auction rate securities market boomed, and the small 
number of broker-dealers managing the auctions stayed relatively the same, 
“it became [more difficult] for [the broker-dealers] to arrange true auctions 
regularly.”91 Therefore, in order to keep the market running smoothly, the 
broker-dealers continually intervened by participating in the auctions at a 
greater rate than they had in the past, instead of “rustling up thousands of 
buyers to meet up with sellers every week or so.”92 For example, during the 
period between January 2006 to February 2008, it is reported that Swiss 
bank “UBS alone may have submitted bids in just under 70% of [the] 
auctions” that it managed.93 By intervening in the auctions to keep them 
afloat, “[t]he banks were the backstop,”94 by preventing failed auctions 
from occurring. The investment banks had a number of reasons to keep the 
market afloat, most notably because they received significant fees from the 
issuers of these securities for managing the auctions.95 However, as the 
United States’ economy began to struggle over the last two years, the 
broker-dealers became nervous about their involvement in the market.96 
                                                                                                                                          
 86. See supra Part I.C. 
 87. See Preston, supra note 15. 
 88. Cherdack & Ball, supra note 81, at 344. “Given the size of the [auction rate securities] 
market, and the fact that each security required a separate auction on the date that the interest rate 
was set to expire, conducting the weekly auctions became unwieldy.” Id. at 343. Therefore, in 
order to further facilitate the market, the broker-dealers used their own funds to keep the securities 
moving between investors. Id. at 343. 
 89. Id. at 343 (“Having invested their own capital in the [auction rate securities] market in 
order to make a secondary market, broker-dealers had every financial incentive to sell them to 
their customers.”).  
 90. Id.  
 91. Gretchen Morgenson, It’s a Long, Cold, Cashless Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, at 
BU. 
 92. Id. Instead of finding a sufficient number of buyers to meet up with the number of sellers, 
the broker-dealers put up more and more of their own funds to purchase the securities from those 
who wanted to sell them. Id. Finding a sufficient number of participants would “be an enormous 
undertaking for the handful of underwriters in the arena.” Id.  
 93. David Enke, The Auction-Rate Security Mess: Reading the Writing on the Wall, 
SEEKINGALPHA.COM, Aug. 10, 2008, http://seekingalpha.com/article/90168-the-auction-rate-
security-mess-read-the-writing-on-the-wall. 
 94. Preston, supra note 15. 
 95. See Cherdack & Ball, supra note 81, at 343. 
 96. See Rockey, supra note 53. 
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The collapse of the auction rate securities market “traces back to the 
surprise surge in mortgage defaults that started” in 2007.97 As the subprime 
mortgage crisis unfolded, the “$146 billion in credit losses and  
write[-]downs” that investment banks experienced began to negatively 
affect other securities markets as well.98 Due to these losses, the broker-
dealers had a “shortage of cash available to commit to the auctions.”99 In 
short, the auction rate securities market became the odd man out because 
“given their exposure to other subprime-tainted securities related to the 
credit crunch, many banks [could] no longer afford to provide . . . support” 
to the auctions.100 Furthermore, the balance of ownership of auction rate 
securities seemed to shift from institutional investors, such as mutual funds 
and insurance companies, to individual investors, such as the Maher 
brothers and other wealthy investors.101 This led to a scenario in which 
many of the auction rate securities were held by less sophisticated investors 
unfamiliar with the true risks of the instruments.102 
All of these problems culminated in February 2008, with the auction 
rate securities market coming to a near standstill.103 Due to investors’ fears 
regarding the strength of the financial markets, the interest of institutional 
and individual investors in purchasing auction rate securities diminished 
greatly, resulting in a shortage of buyers, putting great pressure on the 
investment bank and broker-dealers to prop-up the markets.104 Finally, 
during the week of February 11, 2008, “the broker-dealers, en masse, 
ceased participating in the [auctions],”105 and no longer acted as “buyers of 
last resort.”106 The broker-dealers and investment banks essentially 
“remain[ed] on the sidelines,” neglecting to play the role of savior in the 
auction rate securities auctions as they had done in the past.107 On February 
13, 2008, approximately “80% of [the] auctions failed,”108 and on February 
                                                                                                                                          
 97. Laura Mandaro, Latest Credit-Market Trap Could Hit Closed-End Funds: Failures of 
Auctions to Reprice this Debt has Already Walloped Municipal Bonds, MARKETWATCH,  
Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/latest-credit-landmine-could-hit-closed-end-
funds-munis-suffer. 
 98. Gitomer, supra note 12, at 364. 
 99. Warren & Grant, supra note 36, at 2. 
 100. Johnston, supra note 13. 
 101. Warren & Grant, supra note 36, at 2. As of July 1, 2007, corporations held a large amount 
of the auction rate securities available, owning “$170 billion of these securities, or just over half 
of the total outstanding, according to Treasury Strategies.” Morgenson, supra note 91. However, 
institutional investors began to decrease their holdings through 2007, holding only $98 billion of 
the almost $330 billion auction rate securities available through the second half of 2007. Id. 
 102. Warren & Grant, supra note 36, at 2. 
 103. Frank, supra note 1. 
 104. Fazio et al., supra note 82, at 329. 
 105. Cherdack & Ball, supra note 81, at 343–44. 
 106. Fazio et al., supra note 82, at 329. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Mandaro, supra note 97. During the week of February 11, 2008, “[m]ore than $1 billion of 
auctions of New York City and New York state-backed debt failed [and] . . . . [o]ut of thirteen 
auctions of state-backed debt totaling $867.2 million, only a single $104.5 million series issued by 
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22, 2008, “more than 70% of the publicly offered bond auctions failed.”109 
“Three days in February alone marked the failure of more than 1,000 
auctions.”110 This is especially noteworthy, because “[p]rior to 2008, there 
were only [forty-four] recorded auction failures since the [auction rate 
securities] market’s inception in 1984.”111 
So what did this mean for all of the investors who actually held these 
securities up to early February of 2008? Essentially, they were stuck with 
the auction rate securities and had no way of selling them to others because 
there was no one else looking to buy. Investors were informed by their 
brokers “that they could not sell the securities at auction and [therefore] 
could not access their funds” due to the lack of liquidity in the market.112 
The brokers told their clients “that the best [they] could do for them was to 
offer margin loans to ease the liquidity crunch or attempt to unload the 
securities at a discount to par value in the secondary markets.”113 The 
Maher brothers are a typical example of investors who fell prey to the 
auction rate securities meltdown114—investors who placed their money in 
auction rate securities thinking the securities were safe, short-term, and 
highly liquid, yet ultimately could not sell these securities and lost almost 
any sense of liquidity their investments once possessed. 
The freeze-up in the auction rate securities market also caused a 
diminution in value of many individual investors’ portfolios, at least for 
accounting purposes.115 While these securities are still worth the same value 
that they were previously, their illiquidity has caused some brokers to write-
down the value of some of their clients’ holdings.116 For example, “UBS 
AG announced that despite the soundness of the collateral backing the 
auction[]rate securities, the bank was moving to lower the value of the 
                                                                                                                                          
the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York succeeded.” Dakin Campbell et al., Auction-
Rate Market Turmoil Continues, BOND BUYER, Feb. 15, 2008, at 1. That week, “[t]he largest 
failed auction was $100 million of bonds issued by the Empire State Development Corp. . . .” Id. 
To compare the fail rate versus the success rate, “[e]ight New York City auctions totaling $442.6 
million failed on [February 13] while seven totaling $464.1 million did not fail.” Id. 
 109. Faten Sabry et al., Subprime Securities Litigation: Key Players, Rising Stakes, and 
Emerging Trends, J. ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, Fall 2008, at 109, 115. 
 110. Stephanie Lee, Auction-Rate Securities: Bidder’s Remorse? A Primer, NERA ECONOMIC 
CONSULTING, May 6, 2008, at 1, 13, available at http://www.nera.com/publication.asp?p_ID 
=3474. 
 111. Sabry et al., supra note 109. “In 1989, a big auction failed because [the] company that 
issued the [auction rate] securities, MBank, defaulted.” Morgenson, supra note 91. Further, 
“[t]here have been several NYSE [New York Stock Exchange] and NASD [National Association 
of Securities Dealers] arbitration [a]wards involving ARS [auction rate securities].” Cherdack & 
Ball, supra note 81, at 346–47 (citing Wholey v. Goldman Sachs & Co., NYSE Case No. 1992-
002598, as the largest award resulting in a “$2.8 million [a]ward for the [c]laimants in connection 
with their purchases of” auction rate securities issued by Ratners UK). 
 112. Rockey, supra note 53, at 3. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See supra Introduction. 
 115. Rappeport, supra note 63. 
 116. See Rockey, supra note 53. 
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issues its customers held in their investment accounts to reflect the lack of 
liquidity in the instruments.”117 The loss of liquidity has also harmed small 
business owners, causing some who had invested in auction rate securities 
to draw funds from other sources in order to operate their businesses or pay 
their taxes.118 Even though the collapse in the auction rate securities market 
is “not a credit problem, [but] a liquidity problem,”119 the fact that investors 
in these securities cannot access their funds has had an extremely 
detrimental impact on the financial stability of the investors. And while the 
focus has been on the detriment caused to the individual investors, many 
corporate holders of these securities have faced massive write-downs in the 
value of their auction rate holdings.120 
Not only did this collapse in the market have a significant impact on the 
investors who held these securities, it also greatly affected the issuers of 
these bonds. As explained earlier, when an auction fails, the issuer of the 
securities must pay a “fail rate” to the investors, which can be described as 
a punitive penalty rate specified in the bond documentation.121 Therefore, 
when there are not enough buyers for a particular auction, the company that 
issued the bonds must pay the investors still holding these securities a 
higher interest rate than they would had the auction been successful.122 For 
                                                                                                                                          
 117. Id. “As a rough measure of the magnitude of the problem faced by investment banks 
whose customers were sold these securities, Morgan Stanley announced in its March 19 
conference call with investors that the value of the auction-rate securities held by its customers 
alone was roughly $20 billion.” Id. 
 118. Rappeport, supra note 63. For example, Bill Freeman, an owner of a small copy-machine 
company in Irvine, California, had about $200,000 invested in auction rate securities in an account 
held by UBS. Id. Without the liquidity once provided to his funds, “[he] may have to draw 
operating capital from his 25-employee company, Century Business Services, just to pay his taxes 
this year.” Id. Furthermore, “Freeman also has another $550,000 locked up in auction-rates with 
Wells Fargo, which offered him an $80 credit on his checking account to switch his money from a 
savings account into securities that he was told would take a few days longer to liquidate.” Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. See Rockey, supra note 53. For example, 
[i]n its most recent 10K annual report filed with the SEC, airline JetBlue announced 
that as of Dec[ember] 31, 2007, 72 percent of its $834 million in cash and investment 
securities was held in auction-rate securities. Though it managed to trim its exposure [to 
auction rate securities] to $330 million by Feb[ruary] 11, JetBlue confirmed that $144 
million of the securities was subject to failed auctions and that, because of current 
market conditions, auctions related to these securities will likely be unsuccessful in the 
near future. 
Id. (footnote omitted). “Best Buy, the world’s largest consumer electronic retailer, owned $397 
million in auction-rate securities as of April 25[, 2008].” Mike Meyers & Chris Serres, Auction-
Rate Securities Get No Bidders; The Esoteric Debt Vehicles Promised Low Short-Term Interest 
Rates on Long-Term Debt but Wound Up Costing Millions to Minnesota Companies, STAR TRIB., 
May 26, 2008, at 1D. However, the company had not marked down these investments as of May 
2008, stating that they “believe that the credit quality of [their] auction-rate securities is high and 
that [they] will ultimately recover all the amounts invested in these securities.” Id. 
 121. See supra Part.I.B. 
 122. See discussion supra Part.I.B. 
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example, around the time of the freeze-up “[r]ates on $100 million of bonds 
sold by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey . . . soared to 20 
percent . . . from 4.3 percent a week [earlier].”123 This jump in interest rates 
was also reflected in the fact that “the average rate for seven-day municipal 
auction [rate securities] rose to a record 6.59 percent on Feb[ruary] 13[, 
2008] from 4.03 percent the previous week.”124 This deterioration of the 
auction rate market has also affected the plans of other companies and 
municipalities to raise capital for long-term projects, with most companies 
now relying on other debt markets to raise funds instead of using the once 
reliable auction rate securities market.125 
III. MARKET “STABILIZATION” VERSUS MARKET 
“MANIPULATION” 
A. MARKET “STABILIZATION” AND ITS USES 
“The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated in 1940 that 
‘stabilization’ . . . may be ‘broadly defined’ as ‘. . . the buying of a security 
for the limited purpose of preventing or retarding a decline in its open 
market price in order to facilitate its distribution to the public.’”126 Since 
that time, the SEC has promulgated numerous rules and regulations 
regarding the practices of broker-dealers in the stabilization and 
manipulation of the prices of securities within the financial markets, setting 
forth what practices are and are not allowed to be used by participants in the 
exchange of securities.127 The most important regulation set forth by the 
                                                                                                                                          
 123. Martin Z. Braun, Auction-Bond Failures Roil Munis, Pushing Rates Up (Update 5), 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aju 
0C0WBT8GI. 
 124. Preston, supra note 15. 
 125. See Meyers & Serres, supra note 120. 
  CentraCare Health System, operator of St. Cloud Hospital, [in Summer 2007] 
planned a $200 million debt issue to finance hospital and other construction projects 
before the end of 2007. Instead, the project, to be financed with auction rate securities, 
was delayed . . . . 
  “We got very, very fortunate that we didn’t do it last fall. I think we would have done 
auction-rate securities,” [CentraCare’s Chief Financial Officer, John Seckinger] said. 
“That’s what all the financial advisers and underwriters said was the best market.” 
Id. Instead, the company issued $200 million in bonds, which sold in 15 minutes, just as the 
auction rate securities market was quietly collapsing. Id. 
 126. George S. Parlin & Edward Everett, The Stabilization of Security Prices, 49 COLUM. L. 
REV. 607, 607 (1949) (quoting Statement of the Commission Respecting Distinctions Between the 
Reporting Requirements of Section 16 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 30 
(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 2446, 11 Fed. 
Reg. 10971 (Mar. 18, 1940)). 
 127. See Anti-Manipulation Rules Concerning Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 
7375, Exchange Act Release No. 38,067, Investment Company Act Release No. 22,412, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 520 (Jan. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Anti-Manipulation Rules] (explaining the development of 
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Securities Act of 1934128 regarding the practice of manipulation was  
§ 10(b), which provided that 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national security exchange— . . .  
. . . . 
. . . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.129 
Under the authority set forth in this statute, the SEC adopted Regulation 
M in December 1996.130 “Regulation M restricts offerings, activities, and 
persons where there is a readily identifiable incentive to manipulate the 
price of an offered security.”131 Regulation M is also meant to “govern[] the 
activities of underwriters, issuers, selling security holders, and others in 
connection with securities offerings.”132 
Today “stabilizing” is defined by the SEC as “the placing of any bid, or 
the effecting of any purchase, for the purpose of pegging, fixing, or 
maintaining a price of a security.”133 Stabilization is permissible, but only in 
certain situations and when the regulations set forth by the SEC are 
specifically followed.134 Regulation M prohibits bids or purchases “except 
for the purpose of preventing a retard or decline in the market price of a 
security,” and forbids “stabilizing at a price that the person stabilizing 
knows or has reason to know is . . . the result of activity that is fraudulent, 
manipulative, or deceptive.”135 It is also interesting to note that this 
                                                                                                                                          
United States laws regarding the stabilization and manipulation practices that are and are not 
permissible). 
 128. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78nn (2006)). 
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
 130. Div. of Mkt. Reg., SEC, Revised Staff Legal Bulletin No. 9: Frequently Asked Questions 
About Regulation M (Apr. 12, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/mrslb9.htm; see also 
WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, SECURITIES: PUBLIC & PRIVATE OFFERINGS, § 5:24 (2d ed. 2009) (“Rules 
10b-6, 10b-6A, 10b-7, 10b-8, and 10b-21 were rescinded by the SEC effective March 4, 1997 and 
replaced by Regulation M.”). Regulation M became effective on March 4, 1997. PRIFTI, supra. 
 131. PRIFTI, supra note 130. 
 132. Id.  
 133. 17 C.F.R. § 242.100(b) (2009). 
 134. See Anti-Manipulation Rules, supra note 127, at 535–37. 
 135. 17 C.F.R. § 242.104 (2009). Specifically, § 242.104 states: 
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regulation does not allow for the placing of “more than one stabilizing bid 
in any one market at the same price at the same time.”136 
The practice of price stabilization is a “price-influencing activity 
intended to induce others to purchase the offered security.”137 Therefore, 
“when appropriately regulated it is an effective mechanism for fostering an 
orderly distribution of securities and promotes the interests of shareholders, 
underwriters, and issuers.”138 The SEC has set forth strict guidelines 
regarding the practice of price stabilization in order to “address[] the risk 
that stabilization will create a false or misleading appearance [of the 
security] with respect to the trading market for the offered security.”139 This 
practice of price stabilization is also meant to “occur[] most frequently 
during the period [when a new security enters the market, or] during the 
period of flotation of a new issue.”140 
The practice of price stabilization stems from underwriters’ actions 
during the initial flotation of a security in the market.141 When a corporation 
seeks to raise capital by issuing shares of equity or debt, it will hire an 
investment bank to underwrite the securities being issued to the public and 
to help sell these securities to investors.142 However, when a security 
                                                                                                                                          
  (a) Unlawful Activity. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to 
stabilize, to effect any syndicate covering transaction, or to impose a penalty bid, in 
connection with an offering of any security, in contravention of the provisions of this 
section. No stabilizing shall be effected at a price that the person stabilizing knows or 
has reason to know is in contravention of this section, or is the result of activity that is 
fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive under the securities laws, or any rule or 
regulation thereunder. 
  (b) Purpose. Stabilizing is prohibited except for the purpose of preventing or 
retarding a decline in the market price of a security. 
  (c) Priority. To the extent permitted or required by the market where stabilizing 
occurs, any person stabilizing shall grant priority to any independent bid at the same 
price irrespective of the size of such independent bid at the time that it is entered. 
  (d) Control of Stabilizing. No sole distributor or syndicate or group stabilizing the 
price of a security or any member or members of such syndicate or group shall maintain 
more than one stabilizing bid in any one market at the same price at the same time. 
Id. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Anti-Manipulation Rules, supra note 127, at 535. 
 138. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. 78i(a)(6) (2006)).  
 139. Id. (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28732, 59 Fed Reg. 814, 815 (Jan. 8, 
1991)).  
 140. Alexander Hamilton Frey, Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 
106 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1957). The practice of stabilization usually “consists of purchases of the 
security being distributed for the account of the underwriting syndicate in order to maintain the 
initial offering price or to prevent a decline.” Id. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. The corporation issuing the securities 
contract[s] for these services with an investment banker or underwriter. This contract 
contains the agreed terms of the issue as well as the approximate price to the issuer and 
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initially hits the market, “there may . . . be a time lag between the offering 
of an issue at a stated price and public awareness of its worth, during which 
period the market price may sag.”143 Therefore, instead of waiting for the 
public to realize the actual value of the security, the underwriter may 
“purchase blocks of the very issue they are trying to sell, in order to create 
artificially an appearance of real demand at the offering price, and thus to 
induce prompt public interest in purchasing the securities at that price.”144 
B. MARKET MANIPULATION IN THE AUCTION RATE SECURITIES 
MARKET 
The main purpose of market stabilizing activities is to more efficiently 
facilitate the purchase and sale of a particular security when it is first 
offered to the public in order to prevent an extreme drop in the price of that 
security.145 This practice is a way for broker-dealers and investment bankers 
to legally manipulate the price of a security for the betterment of the market 
as a whole. The SEC, in the Securities Act of 1934 and Regulation M, has 
laid out specific situations in which market stabilizing practices are allowed 
and guidelines that broker-dealers should follow when taking part in these 
practices.146 While the practice of stabilization is legal and somewhat 
encouraged, this note argues that the practices used by the broker-dealers in 
the auction rate securities market went beyond the realm of stabilization, to 
a level of manipulation that contributed to the market’s breakdown. 
By consistently injecting their own funds into the auctions in order to 
prevent failed auctions, the broker-dealers and financial institutions were 
acting as more than just “buyers of the last resort . . . .[They were] 
consistently called upon to stabilize the [auction rate securities] market.”147 
As one bond trader stated, “[t]he truth is there was no natural auction 
success rate. But for the banks acting as market-makers, these auctions 
would have failed from the get go.”148 Rather than injecting capital into a 
security offering for a short period of time to stabilize and prevent undue 
decline in the security’s price, the broker-dealers and financial institutions 
                                                                                                                                          
the ‘spread’ (i.e., the difference between the price realized by the issuer and the price 
charged to the public by the underwriter). The originating underwriter then forms an 
underwriting syndicate, the other members of which proportionately share the risk and 
the potential profit. The members of the underwriting group sell at least half of the issue 
to their customers, and the balance is sold for their account by a selling group which 
they form and with whom they split commissions on this latter amount of the total 
issue. 
Id. at 25–26.  
 143. Id. at 26.  
 144. Id.  
 145. PRIFTI, supra note 130. 
 146. See supra Part III.A. 
 147. Carney, supra note 14. 
 148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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manipulated the auction rate securities market for years. The broker-dealers 
caused the auction rate securities market to have an “illusory liquidity,” by 
consistently manipulating the auctions in order to prevent failures.149 
Unlike the practice of market “stabilization,” in which a broker-dealer 
may attempt to keep the price of a security at a sufficient level for a short 
period of time after the security initially hits the market,150 the broker-
dealers continued to inject their own capital into the auction rate securities 
market on a weekly basis.151 The purpose of stabilizing the price of a newly 
issued security is to show other market participants that the particular 
security is an attractive investment that is trading below its actual value.152 
Further, “[m]any courts have held that stabilization is legal if its purpose is 
in fact to provide support against unusual market conditions in a sincere 
effort to protect the interests of shareholders and investors.”153 However, to 
create a “false impression as to the degree of real interest in a security is a 
form of deception,” and some forms of alleged stabilization may be used to 
disguise illicit manipulation. In the auction rate securities market, the 
alleged “stabilization” that took place was meant to further the interests of 
the broker-dealers and not the investors in those securities.154 By continuing 
to support these auctions that should have failed, the broker-dealers were 
able to continue to reap the large fees that they charged both to the issuers 
of the securities and to the purchasers of the investments. 
IV. HOW GREED FOR MORE FEES FUELED THE COLLAPSE OF 
THE AUCTION RATE SECURITIES MARKET 
For the past two decades, the auction rate securities market provided 
broker-dealers and investment banks with the opportunity to collect 
enormous fees from both the issuers of auction rate securities and the 
investors who placed their funds into these markets.155 The broker-dealers 
used what many would describe as deceptive practices in order to fool 
investors into believing that the market was as safe and as liquid as their 
savings account at their local bank. Most investors in auction rate securities 
now give the same explanation when asked why they invested so heavily in 
a market that was so dysfunctional on the inside; “‘they were told by their 
brokers [that] these [auction rate securities] were safe as cash . . . .’”156 
What has resulted since the collapse of the market has become almost too 
                                                                                                                                          
 149. Cherdack & Ball, supra note 81, at 343.  
 150. See supra Part III.A. 
 151. See Cherdack & Ball, supra note 81, at 343. 
 152. See Frey, supra note 140, at 26. 
 153. Id. at 50.  
 154. Cherdack & Ball, supra note 81, at 343. 
 155. See id. at 343–44.  
 156. Stephen Taub, Auction-Rate Probes Go National, CFO.COM, Apr. 21, 2008, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/11078121/c_11075991?f=TodayInFinance_Inside (quoting Bryan 
Lantagne, Securities Division Director for Massachusetts Secretary of State Willam Galvin). 
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recognizable in the financial services industry—a slew of lawsuits by 
investors and a rash of investigatory probes by state and federal government 
agencies targeted against the broker-dealers who propped-up this faulty 
market.157 
As the auction rate securities market meltdown slowly unfolded to the 
public eye, many began to question the interventionist practices that the 
broker-dealers employed in the market. For example, Martha Mahan 
Haines, Chief of the Office of Municipal Securities at the SEC, asked the 
following question: “Was it in the best interests of issuers and investors to 
be so heavily dependent on broker-dealer intervention to support the 
expansion of [the auction rate securities] market?”158 Looking back on what 
took place in the auction rate securities world over the past several years, 
the answer is clearly “No.”While the broker-dealers who worked in the 
market may defend their practices as stabilizing activities that helped to 
bring liquidity to the market, these practices were the ultimate reason that 
the auction rate securities market came to a extraordinary crash in early 
2008. 
In the auction rate securities market, there were rules and guidelines put 
in place to deal with failed auctions for a reason: failed auctions were a 
natural part of the market. By allowing an auction to fail early in its life, 
signals are sent to investors regarding the credit-worthiness of a particular 
investment, as well as signals sent to issuers that they may want to 
restructure their debt so that they do not use auction rate securities to raise 
capital. While some intervention by broker-dealers is proper and useful 
when dealing with the stabilization of a newly issued security, the 
continuous manipulation of a security over a long period of time could only 
lead to disaster. The intervention by broker-dealers “supported the rapid 
growth of [the auction rate securities] market to over $200 billion.”159 
However, the only proper action that should have been taken by the broker-
dealers was to allow the auction rate securities to continue along their true 
path, even if that meant allowing certain auctions to fail. That a particular 
offering of securities may prove to be unpopular to investors is a “risk 
inherent in the business of underwriting,”160 and the broker-dealers should 
not have taken steps “to avoid this risk by creating an unreal appearance of 
demand for the securit[ies] at the expense of unsuspecting investors thus 
induced to pay artificially inflated prices” on a weekly basis.161 
While many people have asked “[h]ow long did [the broker-dealers] 
know the auctions were on life support,”162 the real question that should 
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have been asked is why did the broker-dealers continually prop-up the 
market knowing that it was flawed from the beginning? The only answer to 
this question appears to be greed. While the financial services markets have 
benefited a great number of people with the creation of new products and 
investment vehicles, there always seems to be a group of people who are 
taken advantage of in order for a select few to gain exorbitant amounts of 
wealth. In the case of the auction rate securities market, not only were 
unsuspecting investors duped into believing they were investing in safe and 
liquid investments,163 but the companies and municipalities that issued these 
securities were also deceived into believing that the securities they were 
issuing would always allow them to borrow money at low interest rates.164 
The actions of the broker-dealers in deceptively framing the auction rate 
securities market as safe and liquid adds to a long list of irrational behavior 
within the financial markets that has pervaded our newspapers and 
television sets over the last two years.165 
As one managing director at a financial advisory firm stated, “[auction 
rate] securities really worked very well for a relatively long period of time  
. . . . It’s possible that people were lulled into a sense of false security 
because if something works well for 20 years you might not be as 
attentive.”166 The “[s]upply [of auction rate securities] would have long 
since exceeded demand had [broker-dealers] not prevented failed auctions 
by buying [the securities] at auctions where there otherwise would not have 
been enough buyers to prevent auction failures.”167 Investors in these 
securities were “unaware of the extent to which dealers were propping up 
the [auction rate securities] auctions,”168 causing investors to believe that 
they could always easily liquidate their holdings regardless of the financial 
situation of the markets. By creating a market that was fueled by a thirst for 
more investment fees, the broker-dealers and investment banks essentially 
caused the mess that they are dealing with today. 
When the auction rate securities market was first created, it was 
intended to be an investment vehicle for corporations and municipalities to 
raise capital using long-term debt with low, short-term interest rates.169 
These securities were also seen as highly safe investments for investors who 
wanted to gain a slightly higher interest rate on their funds, while 
maintaining liquidity that one would normally associate with a bank 
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account or a money-market fund.170 However, over time, this sense of 
liquidity eroded as fewer investors showed up for the auctions each week, 
and the demand for auction rate securities dwindled to extremely low 
levels.171 But instead of allowing the auctions to fail when this demand first 
decreased, the broker-dealers used their own capital to supplement the 
market and plunge the investors into a dangerous state of affairs that 
resulted in the complete collapse of liquidity in the market.172 
The problems that took place within the auction rate securities market 
are simply a furtherance of what we have witnessed in the securities 
markets for the past two decades: “The outrageous bonuses, the slender 
returns to shareholders, the never-ending scandals, the bursting of the 
internet bubble, [and] the crisis following the collapse of Long-Term 
Capital Management . . . .”173 The collapse of the auction rate securities 
market likewise signals how the financial services industry has operated in 
our country, and the great reluctance of those who run the industry to “not 
fac[e] up to how badly [they] have mismanaged [their] business.”174 The 
financial markets should function with a “survival of the fittest” mentality, 
with the strongest investment products and services rising to the top, while 
the inefficient and unproductive products and services are disposed of over 
time. As new and innovative investment tools and vehicles have been 
created, investors and issuers alike have realized more and more ways to 
not only raise capital, but also to subsequently distribute securities among 
those wishing to purchase them.175 Whenever a new type of security or 
instrument does not function properly, or if demand in that type of security 
greatly decreases, one would imagine that investment banks and broker-
dealers would just replace that security with a newer, more advanced 
investment. However, in the case of auction rate securities, broker-dealers 
and investment bankers continued to support a faulty market, instead of 
allowing the market to follow along on its path to either ultimate failure or 
greater innovation. And why? Because, the broker-dealers still “receive[d]  
. . . auction fees even when the auctions fail[ed].”176 
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V. HOW TO HELP AUCTION RATE SECURITIES INVESTORS 
A. CONTINUED SETTLEMENTS WITH INVESTORS AND REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 
Since 2008, a number of financial institutions, including Citigroup, 
Wachovia, and UBS, have reached massive settlements with various 
regulatory institutions regarding their involvement in the auction rate 
securities market meltdown.177 These settlements were in response to state 
and federal investigations of the broker-dealers’ marketing and selling of 
auction rate securities, with many regulatory agencies alleging that the 
broker-dealers and investment banks falsely sold these products as highly 
liquid and cash-equivalent securities.178 In particular, these settlements, 
many of which were reached between the broker-dealers and groups such as 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the New York 
Attorney General’s Office, have resulted in the buyback of approximately 
$61 billion of auction rate securities from investors,179 as well as the 
payment of over $360 million in fines by the broker-dealers.180 
Since these settlements began to unfold, broker-dealers and financial 
institutions have essentially performed a “mea culpa” of ultimate 
proportions, attempting to reimburse the damaged investors in auction rate 
securities with the hope of keeping them around for future business.181 This 
is significant due to the nature of the financial services market, where very 
rarely will a financial institution reach out to help a struggling investor. In 
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today’s financial world, where the trust that existed between investors and 
broker-dealers has essentially vanished, it is pertinent that the financial 
institutions “make good”182 with their customers who were duped into 
purchasing auction rate securities. 
As is expected in the financial markets, “we understand we assume risk 
when we purchase financial instruments, and don’t expect sellers to 
compensate us for market vagaries.”183 However, if the financial institutions 
and broker-dealers are going to regain the trust of the spurned investors to 
try to jumpstart our struggling economy, they must be held accountable for 
their products that they manipulated in order to gain exorbitant profits. The 
settlements that have taken place since 2008 are a welcome sign that the 
broker-dealers recognized their “breach of fair-business-conduct-rules,” an 
essential step in restoring confidence to an industry that has seemingly lost 
the respect of many American citizens. 
B. END INVESTMENTS OF THIS NATURE 
It is easy to see how the collapse of the auction rate securities market 
has affected the overall sentiment surrounding the financial markets; it has 
significantly added to the negativity that is so often associated with Wall 
Street. However, a broader picture that has been painted by this fiasco: the 
limits on how financial institutions and broker-dealers can make money. 
These limitations should be recognized and respected. 
Auction rate securities were products created to fill a long term funding 
need for issuers while supplying investors with a short term borrowing 
opportunity.184 This long-term/short-term arrangement was created with the 
hopes of constantly creating massive fees for broker-dealers, while 
attempting to keep clients and investors blinded from the dangers that came 
along with these investment instruments.185 However, this breakdown in the 
market has shown us that “[s]uch an arrangement is impossible” because 
any type of arrangement that funds long term investments with short term 
liabilities is “inherently unstable.”186 Essentially, auction rate securities 
proved that it is unreasonable and irresponsible to match up sellers of 
oranges with buyers of apples, for the sole purpose of accumulating higher 
investment fees and profits for financial institutions. 
Certain risks and limitations are inherent in the financial services 
market and they are essential restrictions against the creation of investment 
instruments such as auction rate securities. If confidence is going to be 
restored in the financial services industry, broker-dealers and investment 
institutions must understand that there are certain boundaries in which they 
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can operate. And while there are countless numbers of investment products 
which have been created that have benefited both issuers and investors, not 
every investment instrument will prove to be successful. Financial 
institutions must realize that not every financial product that is created is 
beneficial, and only the strongest and safest investment products should be 
marketed to their customers. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the breakdown of the auction rate securities market in early 2008, 
there has been a wave of litigation against the broker-dealers and 
investment banks that so recklessly helped to damage the financial 
circumstances of many.187 Furthermore, the SEC and several state Attorney 
Generals, including New York’s Andrew Cuomo, have conducted 
investigations of numerous broker-dealers188 that have resulted in the 
buyback of millions of dollars worth of auction rate securities from 
investors harmed by the breakdown in the market.189 However, there are 
still a large number of investors who have lost a great deal of wealth and 
liquidity from the destruction of the auction rate securities market,190 which 
could negatively affect their financial situation for years to come. 
The fear of many is that those who were spurned by the investment 
banks and broker-dealers in the auction rate securities meltdown may have 
finally lost all trust in Wall Street and will refuse to come back for their 
services in the future.191 This refusal to return may be warranted, with the 
meltdown of the auction rate securities market causing individual investors 
to finally realize the “[m]e [f]irst”192 motto that has been embraced by Wall 
Street for such a long time. 
While new and innovative investment vehicles are beneficial to the 
securities market, not all investment tools prove to be successful. The 
auction rate securities market was created for those needing capital to raise 
long-term debt with short-term interest rates, and for those needing safe 
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investments to gain a reasonable interest rate using a highly liquid securities 
market.193 However, once the broker-dealers began to manipulate the 
market by refusing to allow auctions to follow their natural path, the safety 
and security of the market vanished. Innovation and productivity are 
essential for the proliferation of wealth in the ever-changing financial 
markets. Yet, with innovation and productivity also comes the risk of 
failure that not every investment tool is worthy of the support of investors 
and financial institutions. The auction rate securities market may have been 
wildly successful for a period of time, but it never should have been falsely 
sustained for so long by the broker-dealers who were the key players in its 
inception. 
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